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Abstract
In this note we consider a realistic multi-winner nested elimination contest in
which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant
of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one
to select the winners sequentially. We show that the nested elimination mechanism
becomes equivalent to another popular mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) where
the winners are chosen simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
In many contests, in which players expend costly resources in order to win a prize, there
are multiple winners. Examples include multiple medals in sports, early bird prizes, set of
winners in rent-seking, set of recipients of research grants - to name a few. In the literature
these contests are interchangably called multi-winner contests (Berry, 1993) or multi-prize
contests (Sisak, 2009). We dene multi-winner contests as contests in which there are more
than one prize, but one player may win at most one of them. Most of the examples mentioned
above is covered by this denition.
In this note we consider a particular multi-winner contest mechanism, in which losers
are sequentially eliminated to reach the nal set of winners, that is widely applied in the
eld. We show that it is a variant of a highly cited mechanisms introduced by Clark and
Riis (1996); and is equivalent to another famous mechanism introduced by Berry (1993).
Berry (1993) was the rst to analyze multi-winner contests using the framework of rent-
seeking (Tullock, 1980). He considers a contest among N players, and k(< N) prizes. He
assumes that the probability of a player to win a prize is the sum of e¤orts expended by any
combination of a k-player group that includes the specied player, divided by any combination
of a k-player group. Hence, the probability that player i wins a prize is:
PBi (x) =
(k   1)X i + (N   1)xi
(N   1) (X i + xi)
where x is the vector of the e¤orts, xi is the e¤ort of player i and X i is the total e¤ort of
all other players.
Clark and Riis (1996) show that this winner selection mechanism inadvertently allows one
prize to be allocated according to e¤ort outlays, while the others are allocated independent of
the e¤ort outlays. This, in turn, results in free riding among players. They further introduce
a nested mechanism in winner selection according to which, players expend e¤ort, then one
player is selected as winner using a Tullock (1980) contest success function. Then that player
and his e¤orts are taken out of the calculation and another Tullock contest is run among the
remaining (N   1) players using their already expended e¤ort, and another winner is taken
out. This procedure is repeated for k times to select the k winners. Here, the probability
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that player i wins a prize becomes:
PCRi (x) = p
1
i +
k 1X
j=1
"
jY
s=1
(1  psi )pj+1i
#
where psi is the probability of player i to win the prize at period s. The issue of allocation
of prizes being independent of the e¤ort outlays does not arise under this mechanism.
Both of the mechanisms are used and cited by researchers investigating issues in multi-
winner contests (see Sisak (2009) for a survey). However, as Clark and Riis (1996) mention,
when one allows the imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest to have several winners,
there is no unique method for selecting those winners". There are other mechanisms that
are employed in the eld in addition to the two mechanisms introduced above.
One of the popular mechanisms employed in the eld is very similar to the one introduced
in the Clark and Riis (1996) study. However, instead of selecting-in winners in each nested
period, the mechanism selects-out losers. This is common in elimination contests in which
the losers are gradually selected out. This includes elimination of losers in sit-and-draw
contests (in which contestants draw pictures and the examiners decide upon the winners by
eliminating the not-so-good drawings), elimination of job candidates to reach the nal set (in
which job candidatesCVs are used to eliminate the candidates who do not have a chance),
promotional tournaments (where conestants are gradually taken out) etc.
Here we consider a mechanism similar to Clark and Riis (1996) to eliminate (N   k)
possible losers in (N   k) elimination periods and show that it turns out to be equivalent
to the mechanism suggested by Berry (1993). We then discuss the implications and possible
extensions regarding those mechanisms.
2 Model
Consider a contest among N players, and k(< N) prizes. The players exert e¤ort only once,
but the winner selection (or loser elimination) process is of multi periods through which
N   k among the N players are eliminated. In each period, one player is eliminated, and
when k players are left, the identical prizes (with individual valuation V ) are granted to the
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survivors. A lottery (Tullock, 1980) type contest success function is employed to eliminate
losers in every period.
To dene the probability of winning a prize, rst let It be the set of survivors at period
t. Also denote the e¤ort level of jth player in It by xtj.
1 Since one and only one player is
dropped out in each period, the number of elements in set It is
jItj = N   t+ 1;
and the aggregate e¤ort at period t is
X t(It) =
N t+1X
j=1
xtj
Then, conditional on player i has survived the previous periods, the probability that he is
eliminated in period t is
qti(It) =
X t   xi
X t   xt1 +X t   xt2 +   +X t   xtN t+1
=
X t   xi
(N   t)X t
As one can easily notice, this probability can be described as a Tullock-type contest failure
function. The denominator is the sum of all possible combinations of N   t playerse¤orts,
and the numerator is the aggregate e¤ort less player is.
Next, we dene the sequence of losers sl as
sl =
 
n1l ; n
2
l ;    ; nN kl

where ntl is the player eliminated in period t according to the schedule of sl. Since sl has
the same information that sequence fItgN kt=1 has, we can dene the probability of ntl being
eliminated in period t as
pt(sl) = q
t
ntl
(It)
provided that sl and It are consistent; i.e., none of

n1l ; n
2
l ;    ; nt 1l
	
is in It, but ntl 2 It.
Then, the probability that player i wins a prize is dened as follows:
Pi(x) =
X
sl2Si
"
N kY
t=1
pt(sl)
#
1Note that the e¤ort is expended only once at the start of the contest. Due to the elimination of players
in each period, denoting the e¤ort for each period (xtj) separately, however, allows ease of notation .
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where x is the vector of the e¤orts, and Si is the set of all sequences (of length N   k) that
do not have i in its slots.
Since the valuations are symmetric, we naturally focus on the symmetric case. Let us
assume that player i exerts xi and all the others x i. Then, for any sl 2 Si,
pt(sl) =
X t   xntl
(N   t)X t
=
(N   t  1)x i + xi
(N   t) [(N   t)x i + xi] ;
and
N kY
t=1
pt(sl) =
(N   2)x i + xi
(N   1) [(N   1)x i + xi]
(N   3)x i + xi
(N   2) [(N   2)x i + xi]   
(k   1)x i + xi
k [kx i + xi]
=
(k   1)x i + xi
(N   1)(N   2)    k [(N   1)x i + xi]
Noting that the number of elements in Si is
jSij = (N   1)!
(k   1)!
which is the number of cases to choose N  k losers among N   1 players (player i is already
chosen as a winner), we can write the probability of player i winning a prize as
Pi(x) =
(N   1)!
(k   1)! 
(k   1)x i + xi
(N   1)(N   2)    k [(N   1)x i + xi]
=
(k   1)x i + xi
(N   1)x i + xi
This contest success function is identical with the one suggested by Berry (1993).2 Hence,
the equilibrium e¤ort and the corresponding comparative statics are also the same as the
ones in Berry (1993).
3 Discussion
We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially elimi-
nated to attain the set of winners. This mechanism incorporates an array of real life contests
2When player i exerts xi and all the others x i, the probability of winning a prize in Berrys mechanism
is PBi (x) = [(k   1)X i + (N   1)xi] = [(N   1) (X i + xi)] = [(k   1)x i + xi] = [(N   1)x i + xi] where
X i is the total e¤ort of all the other players.
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and is similar to the one by Clark and Riis (1996), who consider sequential acceptance of
winners. We show that theoretically this mechanism is equivalent to the simultaneous selec-
tion mechnism of Berry (1993). Since the theoretical results predict di¤erent rent-dissipation
among winner selection mechanisms, the equivalence result allows contest designers to im-
plementation the appropriate mechanism in accordance to their objectives.
It may be possible in the future for one to introduce other popularly employed mechanisms
and compare them with the existing ones. It is also possible to introduce risk aversion,
player asymmetry, and prize asymmetry within this structure. Finally, the existing results
provide clear ranking of rent-dissipation among multiwinner mechanisms, but it would be
interesting to investigate whether the theoretical benchmark results still hold behaviorally.
Very little experimental research had been caried out in the area of multi-winner contests
(see Dechenaux et al. (2012) for a comprehensive survey), and one obvious rst attempt can
be to test and compare these three mechanisms in the laboratory.
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